Developed by Michael E. Porter (How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, 1979).
Rates an industry's rivalry, entry threat, substitutes, supplier power, and buyer power to show where competitive pressure comes from and how much profit the structure allows.
Five forces on meal delivery in three mid-sized cities
Each force is rated from 1 (weak) to 5 (strong) on its drivers. The stronger the forces, the less profit the industry leaves the firms inside it; the list under the verdict puts the strongest force first, the one a strategy has to counter or sidestep. Change a rating and watch the verdict. Illustrative.
Rivalry: three national apps list the same restaurants and send promo codes every week
StrengthNew entrants: an app is cheap to build, but courier fleets and restaurant sign-ups take years
StrengthSubstitutes: cooking at home, picking up takeout, meal kits, and store-made meals
StrengthSuppliers: popular restaurants demand lower commissions, and courier pay rules keep rising
StrengthBuyers: diners switch apps for a coupon and compare prices for free
StrengthAverage strength4.0
VerdictScore every row to see the verdict.Room for profitThe structure leaves margin for the firms; the question is how to claim it.Depends on positionFirms with an edge on the strongest force earn; the rest earn little.Little profit leftRivals, buyers, and suppliers take most of the value before it reaches the firms.
Strongest first
- 5.0Rivalry: three national apps list the same restaurants and send promo codes every week
- 4.0Substitutes: cooking at home, picking up takeout, meal kits, and store-made meals
- 4.0Suppliers: popular restaurants demand lower commissions, and courier pay rules keep rising
- 4.0Buyers: diners switch apps for a coupon and compare prices for free
- 3.0New entrants: an app is cheap to build, but courier fleets and restaurant sign-ups take years
An example
A regional grocery chain's board asked whether it should launch a meal-delivery app in its three home cities, where its stores were well known and its brand trusted. The strategy director drew the industry wide enough to include everything a hungry household might choose instead, then rated each force on its drivers. Rivalry was fierce: three national apps listed the same restaurants and paid for weekly promo codes. Diners switched apps for a coupon. Popular restaurants were already demanding lower commissions, and new rules kept raising courier pay. Cooking, takeout pickup, and meal kits all did the same job. Only entry was moderate, because courier fleets and restaurant sign-ups take years to build.
The average came out at four of five, and the board saw that the chain's brand would win orders the structure then took away. It dropped the app and expanded prepared meals for pickup at its stores, where it ran its own kitchens and no app took a cut.
Why it works
Profit in an industry is set less by how good its firms are than by who else can claim the value they create. Rivals compete it away in price, buyers bargain it down, suppliers bargain it up, substitutes cap what anyone will pay, and the threat of new entrants keeps prices low even before anyone enters. Looking only at direct competitors misses four of the five, and often the largest. Rating each force on its drivers turns a vague sense that a market is tough into a statement of where the pressure comes from, which is what a strategy can act on. A firm can build switching costs against buyers, find a second source against a supplier, or pick a corner of the industry where the strongest force is weaker.
The thinking behind it
Michael E. Porter Michael E. Porter, a Harvard Business School professor, argued in How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy (Harvard Business Review, 1979) that an industry's profitability is set by five forces: rivalry among existing firms, the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitutes, and the bargaining power of buyers and of suppliers. His book Competitive Strategy (1980) turned the article into a full method of industry analysis. The tool is his structure applied to a single market and a single decision.
How to run it
- Draw the boundary. Define the industry by the product and the geography where firms really compete, and keep the substitutes outside but in view.
- List each force's drivers. For rivalry, count the firms and note growth, differentiation, and exit costs; for each other force, name what gives it leverage.
- Rate every force. Score each from weak to strong on its drivers, with one sentence of evidence for the score.
- Find the strongest. Rank the forces and name the one or two that take most of the value.
- Judge the profit left. Say plainly whether the structure leaves room for profit, makes it depend on position, or takes most of it.
- Choose a response. Decide which force to counter, which to sidestep by choosing a different segment, and which to turn to your advantage.
- Redo it on a schedule. Rate the forces again each year or after any new rule, entrant, or substitute, since they shift.
Where it goes wrong
The first failure is a boundary drawn wrong. Too wide and every force is a blur; too narrow and the real substitutes are left out, so rate a substitute you can name or redraw the line. The second is filling five boxes and stopping. A table of ratings with no ranking and no response is a description, so finish by naming the force that matters most and what to do about it. The third is confusing the industry with the firm. A tough industry can hold one very profitable company, and an easy one can hold a failing company, so use the forces to judge the field and use other tools to judge your place in it.
When to use something else
- PESTEL Analysis. When the pressure comes from outside the industry altogether: rules, the economy, technology, or how people live.
- Blue Ocean Strategy Canvas. When the forces say the market is crowded and the question is how to step out of it.
- SWOT Analysis. When the industry is understood and the question is the firm's own strengths and weaknesses within it.
Where it sits in SOLVE eX
Go to the source
- How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, Harvard Business Review, March to April 1979, 1979