Ecosystem Thinking

Thinking Tools3.3 Mapping the System Around the ProblemAlso known as Business Ecosystems

Developed by James F. Moore (Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, 1993) and by Marco Iansiti and Roy Levien (The Keystone Advantage, 2004).

Treats a market as a web of interdependent firms with roles such as keystone, dominator, and niche player, so strategy weighs the health of the network a firm depends on.

A regional payments ecosystem, and what holds it together

Each line is a working tie: money, data, or a product passing between two firms. Select a firm to read its role, size the firms by how many ties they have or how often they sit between two others, then take one out and see who loses their link to the rest. Try the platform first. Illustrative.

How many ties the firm has. Highest: Payments platformRegional bankCard networkOnline bankCheckout app makerLedger app makerLoyalty app makerGrocery chainCafe chainOnline shopTerminal makerRival super-appHow often the firm sits on the shortest route between two others. Highest: Payments platformRegional bankCard networkOnline bankCheckout app makerLedger app makerLoyalty app makerGrocery chainCafe chainOnline shopTerminal makerRival super-app

Select a firm to read its role in the ecosystem.Payments platform. The keystone: connects banks, merchants, and app makers, takes a thin fee on each payment, and spends on tools that make the others' products work. Degree 8 · Betweenness 0.72Regional bank. Holds merchants' accounts and settles their payments through the platform. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.07Card network. Moves card payments between the banks. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.02Online bank. A second bank, also courted by the super-app. Degree 3 · Betweenness 0.16Checkout app maker. A niche player: one product, built on the platform, sold to small shops. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.00Ledger app maker. A niche player: pulls payment data from the platform into merchants' books. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.00Loyalty app maker. A niche player: rewards programs for cafes, running on the platform's data. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.00Grocery chain. A merchant: takes payments through the platform and the checkout app. Degree 3 · Betweenness 0.08Cafe chain. A merchant: takes payments through the platform and runs the loyalty app. Degree 3 · Betweenness 0.08Online shop. A merchant: uses the platform and the bookkeeping app, and is being courted by the super-app. Degree 3 · Betweenness 0.08Terminal maker. Sells card readers to the physical stores. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.01Rival super-app. A would-be dominator: wants merchants and banks to deal only through it, keeping the value for itself. Degree 2 · Betweenness 0.02

FirmDegreeBetweenness
Payments platform80.72
Regional bank20.07
Card network20.02
Online bank30.16
Checkout app maker20.00
Ledger app maker20.00
Loyalty app maker20.00
Grocery chain30.08
Cafe chain30.08
Online shop30.08
Terminal maker20.01
Rival super-app20.02

An example

A regional payments platform had a proposal on the table from its finance team: raise the fee charged to the app makers who built on it, from 10% to 25% of their revenue. The app makers had few alternatives, and the forecast showed a quick gain in margin.

The head of strategy mapped the ecosystem first. The platform sat between two banks, three merchant chains, three small app makers, and the card network; nearly every route from a merchant to a bank ran through it. The apps were niche players, each small, but they were the reason merchants stayed: the grocery chain's checkout, the cafe chain's loyalty program, and the online shop's bookkeeping all ran on the platform's data. A rival super-app was courting the online shop and one of the banks. Raising the app fee would weaken the firms that kept the merchants loyal, just as a would-be dominator was looking for a way in. The platform kept the fee, opened a fund for new apps, and signed the online shop to a three-year term.

Why it works

Firms are judged one industry at a time, but their results depend on a network of partners, suppliers, and complementors who succeed or fail together. A move that wins locally (a higher fee, an exclusive deal, absorbing a partner's product) can weaken the network the firm relies on, and the loss shows up later as partners that leave or never arrive.

The ecosystem view sorts firms by the role they play. A keystone keeps the network healthy and takes a modest share of the value it helps create; a dominator absorbs the network or extracts so much value that it thins; niche players specialize and depend on the keystone's platform. Mapping the ties and asking what happens if one firm disappears shows which firms hold the network together, and whether a proposed move fits the role the firm actually plays.

The thinking behind it

James F. Moore James F. Moore introduced the business ecosystem in Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition (Harvard Business Review, 1993). Firms, he argued, compete and cooperate within networks that coevolve around a leader, each firm adapting as the others change. Strategy therefore has to consider the whole network a firm belongs to, not just the one industry it is filed under.

Marco Iansiti Marco Iansiti, a Harvard Business School professor of technology and operations management, and Roy Levien set out the roles in The Keystone Advantage (2004). They applied the ecologist's keystone species to business: firms play keystone, dominator, or niche roles, and a keystone creates platforms that keep the whole network healthy and prospers because the network does. The book's title names that claim: the keystone's advantage lies in the health of the network it depends on.

How to run it

  1. Map the players. Every firm the business depends on or serves: partners, suppliers, complementors, customers, and rivals.
  2. Draw what flows between them. Money, data, products, and customers, one tie at a time.
  3. Find the keystones. Ask which firm's loss would break the most ties; the firms that sit between the others usually are.
  4. Name the firm's own role. Keystone, dominator, or niche player, judged by what it does to the network and not by its size.
  5. Test each proposed move against the role. Ask what it does to the partners who depend on the firm, a year after it lands.
  6. Watch for dominators. A rival trying to absorb the firm's partners or customers is a threat to the whole network.
  7. Invest where the network's health protects the firm. Tools for partners, fair terms, and room for new niche players.

Where it goes wrong

Every firm calls itself a keystone. A firm that takes most of the value and calls its partners an ecosystem is a dominator with a good slide. Ask what share of the value created in the network the firm takes, and whether its partners are growing.

The map stops at contracts. Firms with no agreement but real dependence (an app maker whose product the platform's merchants rely on) get left off. Draw ties by what flows, not by what is signed.

Health becomes a reason never to compete. Keeping the network healthy does not mean protecting every partner from every change. Defend the ties that carry the network, and let weak niche players be replaced by stronger ones.

When to use something else

  • Porter's Five Forces. When the question is how attractive one industry is and who holds the bargaining power in it.
  • Network Effects. When the value of the product grows with the number of users, and the question is how to reach the point where it does.
  • Wardley Map. When the job is deciding which components of the business to build, buy, or rent.

Where it sits in SOLVE eX

Go to the source

  • Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, Harvard Business Review, 1993
  • The Keystone Advantage: What the New Dynamics of Business Ecosystems Mean for Strategy, Innovation, and Sustainability, 2004

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