Named by Garrett Hardin (The Tragedy of the Commons, 1968) from the overgrazing example of William Forster Lloyd (1833), and qualified by Elinor Ostrom (Governing the Commons, 1990).
Explains how open access to a shared, limited resource leads each user to take more, since each gains fully while the cost is spread, until the resource degrades.
Six teams book extra hours on a shared test lab, and the wait they all share climbs
Each team books a few hours more than it needs, in case. Every booking helps the team that makes it, while the wait it adds falls on all six. At rest, three extra hours each tip the lab into a spiral of longer waits and more booking (R1). Set a cap on each team's bookings and Play again: at 10 hours the wait stays at half a day. Illustrative.
Extra hours booked per team
Wait for the lab, working days
Week 16 of 16
- Extra hours booked per team
- 8.7
- Wait for the lab, working days
- 21.8
- R1, The scramble
- Longer waits make every team book further ahead, which lengthens the wait for everyone. No negative (−) links: an even count, so the loop reinforces.
- B1, The shared cost
- Extra bookings add to the shared wait, and the wait eats the head start each team booked for. One negative (−) link: an odd count, so the loop balances.
- Each team's extra hours
- Hours booked beyond what the team's tests need, held in case a test runs long. About half go unused, but no one else can have them.
- Total hours booked
- Six teams need 48 of the lab's 60 hours a week. Bookings above 60 join a queue.
- Wait for the lab
- Working days from request to test. Half a day while bookings fit inside 60 hours, then rising with the queue.
- Each team's head start
- What booking ahead buys a team: its test runs when it wants. The gain is real for the first team to do it and shrinks as the shared wait grows.
- Booking cap
- A limit on each team's bookings per week, set and policed by the teams that use the lab.
An example
Six product teams at a medical device maker shared one environmental test lab, with chambers that run units hot, cold, and wet for 60 hours a week. The teams needed about 48 of those hours. After one team missed a launch date waiting for a chamber, every team began booking three extra hours a week in case a test ran long.
Within a month the wait for a chamber went from half a day to two days. By week sixteen it was over four weeks, and teams were booking further ahead each week to protect themselves from a wait they were causing together. The lab manager had sent emails asking teams to book only what they needed, and nothing changed, since any team that complied simply lost its place. The six team leads then met, agreed on a cap of ten hours per team per week, released unused hours a day before each slot, and set a monthly review of the cap among themselves. The wait went back to half a day.
Why it works
The tragedy follows from arithmetic, and it needs no villain. A team that books one more hour gets the whole benefit of it, while the cost, a slightly longer wait, is split six ways and its own share is small. So every team has a reason to book more, and each is right on its own numbers. Together they wear down the thing they all depend on, and an appeal for restraint cannot hold, because the team that listens only loses its place.
Mapping who gains and who pays for each extra use shows why appeals fail and what works in their place: changing the terms of access. A cap, a price, metering, or a rule the users set and enforce among themselves puts the cost of each extra use back on the user who chooses it.
The thinking behind it
William Forster Lloyd William Forster Lloyd, Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford from 1832 to 1837, gave the founding example in Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (1833). On a pasture open to every commoner, each one gains the whole value of adding an animal, while the cost of thinner grass is spread across all users, so each has a reason to keep adding animals until the pasture is overgrazed.
Garrett Hardin Garrett Hardin, an ecologist, named the pattern in The Tragedy of the Commons (Science, 1968), building on Lloyd's pasture. When a resource is open to all, each user gains the full benefit of taking more while the cost is shared by everyone, so the resource is overused though no one wants that outcome. Critics noted that the essay ran together common property and open access, and Hardin later said it should have been called The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons.
Elinor Ostrom Elinor Ostrom, the political scientist who in 2009 became the first woman to receive the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, qualified Hardin in Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990). Her field studies of fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems found communities governing shared resources well without privatization or state control, and she distilled eight design principles from the institutions that lasted. A cap set and policed by the lab's own users follows her line.
How to run it
- Name the resource being worn down. Lab hours, meeting time, executive attention, a shared budget line, or a shared service team.
- List who has access, on what terms. Note who can draw on it, how much, and whether anyone tracks the draw.
- Map the gain and cost of one extra use. Write who gets the benefit of one more unit and who bears its cost.
- Check the rules already in place. Formal limits, informal norms, and how either is enforced, if at all.
- Choose the remedy. A cap, quota, price, meter, or user-set rule; pick the lightest one that changes the arithmetic.
- Let the users own the rule. Have the people who draw on the resource set the limit and watch it, with a sanction everyone knows.
- Pilot and keep measuring. Watch the resource's condition, here the wait, for a few cycles before widening the rule.
Where it goes wrong
The usual failure is blaming the users. Emails asking teams to take only what they need, or naming the worst offender, change nothing while the gain stays private and the cost stays shared. Spot it when the third reminder has gone out and the numbers have not moved, and recover by changing the terms of access.
The second failure is assuming every shared resource is a tragedy waiting to happen. Many groups run a commons well for years on simple, enforced norms, so check what already works before importing a heavy rule. The third is a cap nobody monitors. A limit no one checks becomes a suggestion within a quarter, and the scramble returns.
When to use something else
- Ostrom's Design Principles. When the decision is how a group of users should govern the resource, and the rules themselves need designing.
- Success to the Successful. When an allocation rule exists and keeps handing the shared resource to whoever won it last time.
- Queueing Theory. When the question is how much capacity the resource needs to keep waits acceptable at honest demand.
Where it sits in SOLVE eX
Go to the source
- Two Lectures on the Checks to Population, 1833
- The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, 1968
- Governing the Commons, Cambridge University Press, 1990