Evolutionary Reasoning

Thinking Tools3.3 Mapping the System Around the ProblemAlso known as Universal Darwinism, Variation, Selection, and Retention

From Charles Darwin (On the Origin of Species, 1859), generalized by Donald T. Campbell (1960), Richard Dawkins (Universal Darwinism, 1983), Daniel C. Dennett (Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995), Alex Mesoudi (Cultural Evolution, 2011), and Scott E. Page (The Model Thinker, 2018), and applied to firms by Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter (An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 1982).

Tests whether variation, selection, and retention are at work among ideas, products, or firms, and if so reads their features as the work of selection pressure.

Forty dishwasher models over twelve model years, with buyers who keep the cheapest to run

Each model year, makers vary their designs, restaurants buy the models that cost least to run, and next year's models copy the survivors. Play: the average running cost falls year by year, though no maker planned it. Set selection or variation to zero and Play again: the change soon stops. Illustrative.

75%
100

Average running cost of models on sale, a year

0: $4,0001: $3,8592: $3,7303: $3,5734: $3,4775: $3,3556: $3,2117: $3,0528: $2,9329: $2,80710: $2,72411: $2,61212: $2,429$0$1,000$2,000$3,000$4,00001234567891011120: $4,0001: $3,8592: $3,7303: $3,5734: $3,4775: $3,3556: $3,2117: $3,0528: $2,9329: $2,80710: $2,72411: $2,61212: $2,429$0$1,000$2,000$3,000$4,0000123456789101112

Spread of running costs across models, a year

0: $4001: $4102: $4183: $4244: $4285: $4326: $4357: $4378: $4399: $44010: $44111: $44212: $442$0$1,000$2,000$3,00001234567891011120: $4001: $4102: $4183: $4244: $4285: $4326: $4357: $4378: $4399: $44010: $44111: $44212: $442$0$1,000$2,000$3,0000123456789101112

Model year 12 of 12

Average running cost of models on sale, a year
$2,429
Spread of running costs across models, a year
$442

An example

A maker of commercial dishwashers was planning its next model and asked why nearly every machine on the market had converged on a heat-recovery unit and a rinse that used half the water of ten years earlier. No regulation required either, and no single competitor had led the way. The leadership team assumed someone had designed the market's direction and wanted to know who.

A product strategist treated the market as a population instead: about forty models each year, varying as makers tried new ideas, restaurants buying the ones that cost least to run, and every maker copying what sold. All three conditions held, so she read the shared features as products of that selection. Running cost was what the market selected for, about $1,600 a year off the average in twelve model years, and premium features that did nothing for it had come and gone. The team set a running-cost target below the best model on sale and budgeted more design trials, since a market that selects this way rewards the maker that tries the most variants.

Why it works

When a population of products, practices, or firms shares a feature, the natural explanation is a designer: someone decided. Often nobody did. If the population varies, if some variants survive while others drop out, and if survivors are copied, the population moves toward whatever the selection rewards, with no one steering. The features that spread are evidence of the pressure, and the features that persist without use are traces of pressures that have since eased.

Checking the three conditions turns a loose analogy into a test. When they hold, the useful questions change: what is being selected for, how fast it is working, and what keeps variation alive. A firm that knows the pressure can aim at it, and a firm that tries more variants than its rivals gets more chances at the next survivor.

The thinking behind it

Charles Darwin Charles Darwin set out evolution by natural selection in On the Origin of Species (1859): heritable variation, a struggle for existence, and the differential survival and reproduction of better-fitted variants, which together change populations over generations. None of the three needs anyone to intend the result, which is what lets the argument travel beyond biology: wherever the three conditions hold, a population changes as if it were designed.

Donald T. Campbell Donald T. Campbell, a methodologist and philosopher of social science, carried the argument to knowledge itself in Blind Variation and Selective Retentions in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (Psychological Review, 1960). Creative and scientific discovery, in his account, is variation followed by selective retention, the core of his evolutionary epistemology. The theory has been debated for decades, and critics argue that its key term, blindness, was never precisely defined.

Richard R. Nelson Richard R. Nelson, a Columbia economist, founded modern evolutionary economics with Sidney G. Winter in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). They modeled firms as bundles of routines that search for improvements and are selected by markets, in place of the textbook firm that maximizes profit with full knowledge. On that view an industry changes through search and market selection, the way a population changes through variation and survival.

How to run it

  1. Ask whether the population varies. Check for many versions of the product, practice, or firm, with new ones still appearing.
  2. Ask whether some survive and others drop out. Look at discontinued models, abandoned practices, and exits, with the reasons given.
  3. Ask whether survivors are copied. Check whether winning features spread to newcomers through imitation, hiring, or licensing.
  4. If all three hold, stop looking for a designer. Look for the selection pressure instead.
  5. Read shared features as signs of the pressure. Ask what the survivors have in common that the losers lacked.
  6. Read leftover features as history. Features that persist without use point to pressures that have since eased.
  7. Act on the pressure. Set targets against it, and keep variation alive with trials, since selection works only on what exists.

Where it goes wrong

The first failure is the just-so story. Any feature can be explained after the fact as an adaptation, and an explanation that could never have been wrong explains nothing. Recover by naming the selection pressure in advance and checking it against the losers as well as the survivors.

The second is assuming the three conditions without checking them. Many industries copy poorly or select on luck, and evolutionary language then adds nothing. The third is mistaking survival for quality. Selection rewards what the environment rewards, which may be low running cost, easy selling, or merely arriving first, and a feature that won for one reason can be wrong for the firm's own purpose.

When to use something else

  • Red Queen Effect. When rivals are adapting to each other and the question is how fast a firm must change just to hold its place.
  • Path Dependence Analysis. When an early accident, more than ongoing selection, explains why a feature persists.
  • Lindy Effect. When the question is how long a practice or product that has already lasted will keep lasting.

Where it sits in SOLVE eX

Go to the source

  • On the Origin of Species, 1859
  • Blind Variation and Selective Retentions in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes, Psychological Review, 1960
  • An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 1982
  • Universal Darwinism, in Evolution from Molecules to Men, ed. D. S. Bendall, Cambridge University Press, 1983
  • Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995
  • Cultural Evolution, 2011
  • The Model Thinker, 2018

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