Rooted in Mary Parker Follett's integration of interests (Constructive Conflict) and the integrative bargaining of Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie (A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, 1965), and set out by Roger Fisher and William Ury (Getting to Yes, 1981).
Separates what each side demands from why it wants it, then builds options that serve both sides' underlying interests, chosen by fair standards both accept.
Two positions with no overlap, opened into the interests behind them
Each side's demand opens into what it is for. Select a box to read it, then select the links under the tree: one shared interest, one real conflict, and the options that answer both. Illustrative.
Links between branches:
An example
A software team's manager announced three office days a week. The team's most senior engineer, remote for four years, answered that she would come in zero days and hinted that she would leave before she did. Each restated the number in two more meetings, and nothing moved.
An HR partner sat them down and asked each of them one thing: what would your number get you? The manager wanted the two new hires to stop losing days on questions a short conversation would answer, and he wanted to see a slipping release before the customer did. The engineer wanted her three hours of commuting back for design work, and she wanted the new hires ready, since she expected to lead the team in the spring. They agreed on one fixed team day, Tuesday, with her running pairing and design reviews; a daily fifteen-minute video standup; and a review after one quarter of how fast the new hires closed their first tickets.
Why it works
A position is one answer to a need, picked before the other side was consulted. Two answers can exclude each other while the needs behind them do not: three days and zero days share nothing, but faster new hires and protected focus time can both be met. Asking what a demand is for moves the talk off a single line, where every gain for one side is a loss for the other, into a wider space where one option can serve both.
Each position usually rests on several interests, and some are shared, which is where agreement starts. Where a real conflict remains, a standard both accept in advance (a market rate, a precedent, a trial with an agreed measure) settles it, and neither side has to back down in front of the other.
The thinking behind it
Mary Parker Follett Mary Parker Follett, in her lecture Constructive Conflict (collected in Dynamic Administration, 1940), named three ways a conflict can end: domination, where one side wins; compromise, where each gives up part of what it wanted; and integration, where the parties find a solution that meets what both really want. She held that conflict, handled well, can be constructive, and that integration is the way to make it so. This method is her integration made routine.
Richard E. Walton Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, in A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (1965), separated distributive bargaining, which divides a fixed sum, from integrative bargaining, which solves problems for joint gain, and set both beside the shaping of the relationship and the bargaining within each side. Their split explains why one dispute can be a tug of war or a shared problem, depending on which game the parties play.
Roger Fisher Roger Fisher, director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and William Ury wrote Getting to Yes (1981), which turned the idea into four working rules: separate the people from the problem, focus on interests instead of positions, invent options for mutual gain, and insist on objective criteria. The book also named the BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, which tells each side when no deal beats the one on offer. Bruce Patton, who edited the first edition, joined as coauthor from the second.
How to run it
- Write down each position as stated. Use the other side's own words and your own demand, before anyone explains or defends either.
- Ask what each position is for. Questions such as "what would that give you?" and "what problem does it solve?" usually bring out two or three interests per position.
- Mark the interests both sides share. Say them aloud, so both sides hear the overlap before anyone proposes terms.
- Handle the relationship on its own track. Acknowledge history and frustration in their own conversation, so goodwill is never traded against terms.
- Invent options before judging any. Aim for six or more, including some that change the timing, the scope, or who does which part.
- Test each option against both lists. Keep the options that serve at least one interest on each side and break no must on either.
- Settle what remains by a fair standard. Agree on the market rate, precedent, or trial measure before looking at what it says, so the result binds both.
Where it goes wrong
The interests named are the polite ones. Each side lists its respectable reasons and keeps the real one (status, a promise to someone else, fear of looking weak) to itself, and options built on the polite list stall. When a deal looks right on paper and nobody signs, ask what would make it hard to say yes.
The other side keeps bargaining on positions. Asking about interests while they push a number means making every concession. Name what is happening, and know your walk-away before the next round.
Options are judged as they are proposed. The first objection ends the search, and the parties settle on the first idea that survives. Invent in one pass and judge in another.
When to use something else
- BATNA and ZOPA. When the deal turns on one number and the question is how far each side can go before walking away.
- Mutual Gains Approach. When several parties are at the table and the process itself, from preparation to follow-through, needs a structure.
- Tactical Empathy. When the other side will not talk about interests until it feels heard, and the first job is lowering the temperature.
Where it sits in SOLVE eX
Go to the source
- Constructive Conflict, a lecture, collected in Dynamic Administration
- A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, McGraw-Hill, 1965
- Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Houghton Mifflin, 1981