From the Anglo-American common-law rules for authenticating evidence, codified in Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902 (1975), and extended to digital evidence by Karen Kent, Suzanne Chevalier, Tim Grance, and Hung Dang (Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, 2006).
Keeps an unbroken log of everyone who handled a piece of evidence, with what they did, when, and where, so findings can show the evidence is unaltered.
Five links from the director's desk to the report, and what a break in one costs
Each row is one handling of the laptop on its way to the forensic report. Pick how each was done; the lines under the rows say which claims the report can prove and whether the chain holds. It opens with one link broken: the courier's drop at reception as it would have stood had the receptionist not signed for it. Switch it to the handoff as it happened and the chain holds. Illustrative.
Taking it from the desk
Copying the drive
Delivery to the lab
Overnight at the lab
The analysis
- This is the laptop from his desk
- Pick every rowOpen to challenge: no record from the moment it was takenShown by the log, the seal, and the witness
- The copy matches the drive
- Pick every rowOpen to challenge: no hash to compareShown: the two hashes match
- Nobody had it unrecorded on the way
- Pick every rowOpen to challenge: forty minutes at reception, unloggedShown: signed for, seal number noted
- Nobody touched it overnight
- Pick every rowOpen to challenge: anyone in the lab could reach itShown by the access log
- The files are as he left them
- Pick every rowOpen to challenge: the original was opened, or never hashedShown: the copy's hash matched before and after
- The chain
- Pick every rowBroken: every finding after the gap can be challengedUnbroken: the findings stand on the evidence
An example
Internal audit at a building-supplies distributor suspected a regional sales director of approving invoices from a vendor that did not exist. The director would be dismissed, and he had already hired a lawyer, so the audit lead treated his laptop as evidence from the first minute.
She collected it from his desk with a security officer as witness, wrote the time and the asset tag in the log, and sealed it in a numbered bag. A technician imaged the drive through a write blocker and recorded the hash of the original and of the copy, which matched. The bag then went by courier to the outside forensic firm. The courier left it at the firm's reception for forty minutes; the receptionist signed for it, with the time and the seal number. The analyst worked only on the copy and rechecked its hash before and after.
At the arbitration, the director's lawyer asked about the forty minutes. The log answered: same seal, same number, same hash. The findings stood.
Why it works
Evidence persuades only if the other side cannot raise a reasonable doubt that it is what it claims to be. A log written at the moment of each handling, with who, what, when, where, and why, closes off the doubts one by one: the drive in the report is the drive from the desk, nobody had it unaccounted for, and nothing changed it.
The hash does for a digital copy what a seal does for a bag. Any change to a single byte changes the hash, so matching values before and after each step prove the data is untouched without anyone having to be believed. The discipline is written for an opponent who has not appeared yet. A gap that seems harmless today is exactly where a lawyer will push in a year.
The thinking behind it
Karen Kent Karen Kent wrote NIST Special Publication 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response (2006), with Suzanne Chevalier, Tim Grance, and Hung Dang. The federal guide sets out how to collect, examine, analyze, and report digital evidence during an incident, and how to handle it so its custody can be shown. It extends a much older rule from the common law of evidence, written into Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902 (1975): whoever offers evidence must show it is what they say it is.
How to run it
- Prepare before collecting. Have the log, labels, numbered tamper-evident bags, and a write blocker ready before anyone touches the item.
- Record the collection. Write the source, the time, the collector, and the witness, and give the item a unique number.
- Image and hash digital evidence. Copy the drive through a write blocker, record the hash of the original and the copy, and store the original sealed.
- Log every transfer. Each handoff gets who, what, when, where, and why, signed by both the person giving and the person receiving.
- Control storage. Keep the item in a locked place with its own access log, and record every time it goes in or out.
- Work only on copies. Recheck the copy's hash before and after each analysis, and record the tool and its version.
- Tie each finding to the log. In the report, cite the evidence number and the log entry behind every finding.
Where it goes wrong
The log is written from memory. Entries reconstructed at the end of the day, or the week, are the first thing challenged and the easiest to discredit. Write each entry at the moment of the action, and if one was missed, record the gap honestly as a gap.
The analyst works on the original. Opening the drive itself, even once, changes it and hands the other side an argument. Image first, seal the original, and work only on copies whose hash matches.
The chain is skipped because nobody expects a dispute. Internal reviews turn into dismissals, lawsuits, and regulator inquiries without warning, and a sloppy chain cannot be repaired afterward. Treat any review that could end someone's job as evidence from the start.
When to use something else
- Blameless Postmortem. When the incident needs to be learned from, with no one facing discipline, and candor matters more than proof.
- Architecture Decision Records. When the record needed is of decisions and their reasons, kept so later teams can trace why a system is the way it is.
- Burden of Proof Analysis. When the question is who has to prove what, and to what standard, before collecting anything.
Where it sits in SOLVE eX
Go to the source
- Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, NIST Special Publication 800-86, 2006
- Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 901 and 902, 1975