Oliver E. Williamson

Thinkers1932 to 2020Economist

Works

In Political Tactics

Ideas

Asset specificity. Some investments are specialized to a particular relationship and lose much of their value outside it, such as knowledge of one firm's systems or customers. Once such investments are made, the parties depend on each other and each is exposed to the other taking advantage, so the choice of governance, from market contract to hierarchy, turns largely on how specific the assets are.

Opportunism and bounded rationality. Williamson's transaction cost economics rests on two assumptions about people: their rationality is bounded, so contracts are always incomplete, and some are opportunistic, which he defined as self-interest seeking with guile and later described as including incomplete or distorted disclosure of information. Organizations exist partly to safeguard transactions against these hazards.

What it explains

Williamson explains why people who hold knowledge or relationships that cannot easily be replaced gain bargaining power, and why those who have invested deeply in one role can be held in place by it. He also explains why controls, approvals, and review layers grow wherever the organization fears that people will exploit what others cannot see.

Political Tactics that draw on Oliver E. Williamson (82)

In Organizational Structures

Known for

Transaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis

Ideas

The M-form hypothesis. The multidivisional form, with a general office that allocates capital and monitors divisions run as quasi-firms, economizes on bounded rationality and opportunism better than the functional form and so favors goal pursuit and least-cost behavior. Caveat: Tests are mixed: Armour and Teece (1978) found an advantage only while the form was spreading, Habib and Victor (1991) found fit unrelated to performance in service multinationals, and Freeland (1996) disputed the account at General Motors.

The H-form. The holding company, a loose arrangement of largely autonomous subsidiaries without a strong general office, which the theory expects to fall short of the M-form's internal controls. Caveat: This entry draws only on passages of the book.

Markets, hierarchies, and the M-form. Williamson explained when hierarchy replaces the market and argued that the multidivisional form economizes on bounded rationality and opportunism in large firms. Caveat: Tests of the M-form hypothesis are mixed.

The unitary form (U-form). The functionally departmentalized firm whose central office handles both strategic and operating decisions, which becomes overloaded as the firm grows and diversifies. Caveat: This entry draws only on passages of the book, and the word overloaded is this series' reading of them.

Market, hybrid, and hierarchy. Three generic forms of economic organization distinguished by coordinating and control mechanisms, ability to adapt, and contract law, with the cost-effective choice varying with the attributes of transactions. Caveat: Conceptual; Powell (1990) argues that network forms are neither market nor hierarchy, against reading them as hybrids.

The conglomerate as a variant of the M-form. The conglomerate that adopts multidivisional structure is the M-form's conglomerate variant and acts as a miniature capital market, as distinct from the holding company, a divisionalized firm without the internal control apparatus. Caveat: This entry draws only on passages of the book; the tests of the M-form hypothesis apply here too.

Organizational Structures that draw on Oliver E. Williamson (7)

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