Works
- Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305 to 360, 1976
- Rights and production functions: an application to labor-managed firms and codetermination, Journal of Business 52(4), 469 to 506, 1979
- Eclipse of the public corporation, Harvard Business Review 67 (September to October 1989), 1989
- Specific and general knowledge, and organizational structure, in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander (eds.), Contract Economics, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, 251 to 274; reprinted in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8(2), 4 to 18, 1995, 1992
In Thinking Tools
Known for
A financial economist at Rochester and Harvard whose paper with William H. Meckling founded agency theory as used in corporate finance: the firm is a set of contracts, and agency costs arise because a manager who owns only part of the firm bears only part of the cost of acting in their own interest.
Thinking Tools that draw on Michael C. Jensen (1)
In Organizational Structures
Known for
Agency theory and organizational architecture
Ideas
Rights and production functions. With Meckling, the argument that a firm's production possibilities depend on its property and contracting rights, applied to labor-managed firms, codetermination, cooperatives, and partnerships. Caveat: A theoretical analysis.
The LBO association. Jensen described the LBO Association as a new organizational form: like a conglomerate it has many divisions or business units, companies taken private, but an LBO partnership that sponsors the going-private transactions counsels and monitors their managers, and the association substitutes compensation incentives and ownership for direct monitoring by headquarters, so the headquarters stays small (KKR's had 16 professionals and 44 other employees). Caveat: A practitioner article in Harvard Business Review, drawn on here only in passages; only its account of structure is drawn on here, not its financing.
Decision rights and specific knowledge. With Meckling, Jensen argued that decision rights should be placed where specific knowledge is and paired with performance measurement and rewards that control the resulting agency costs. Caveat: A theory; tests rest on others' work.